That's not really how risk is managed in aviation. ICAO will have made a list of all possible ways a power bank could create a hazard. Then for each failure mode, they'll come up with two numbers: probability, and severity. There's a formula to combine those two numbers into a single risk score. Any risks over the acceptable threshold (varies depending on the circumstances and I can't remember what it is for human-rated transport) must be mitigated.
A mitigation is anything that reduces the probability or the severity of a risk. There are different categories of mitigation, some of which are more robust than others. Once the risk score moves below the acceptable threshold, the risk is satisfactorily mitigated.
Example: Rapid depressurization. Without mitigation, the risk of rapid depressurization is unacceptably high. So we mitigate the probability by requiring sensitive inspections for metal fatigue, and we mitigate the severity by providing oxygen masks, a standard flight crew procedure for making an emergency descent, and regular training on that procedure. (Plus a bunch of other things I'm not thinking of off the top of my head.)
Assuming ICAO did their due diligence - and I don't have any reason to think they didn't - they would've assessed the probability and severity of all of the ways a consumer power bank might fail. That analysis is the rationale for both the number of power banks allowed on a flight and what you're allowed to do with them. And yes, they will have considered the probability of people not following the rules (which is the reason, btw, that airplane lavatories have enormous "no smoking" signs right above an ash tray).
A great deal of ATC relies on automation, such as systems like ASDE-X, which is used at LGA. ASDE-X uses radar and vehicle transponders (among other things) to detect collision hazards on the ground. Unfortunately ASDE-X only works if every vehicle has a transponder.
ASDE-X is an automated system that alerts tower and ground controllers to collision hazards on the airport surface. A transponder is a device that either responds to radar pings or continuously broadcasts the vehicle's position. They are mandatory equipment for aircraft, and at most large airports they're required for all ground vehicles too. The two systems work together.
If the truck had had a transponder, ASDE-X would've automatically alerted the controller who was working that night. So there's another link in the chain, in addition to the staffing issue and the failure to visually clear the runway.
A mitigation is anything that reduces the probability or the severity of a risk. There are different categories of mitigation, some of which are more robust than others. Once the risk score moves below the acceptable threshold, the risk is satisfactorily mitigated.
Example: Rapid depressurization. Without mitigation, the risk of rapid depressurization is unacceptably high. So we mitigate the probability by requiring sensitive inspections for metal fatigue, and we mitigate the severity by providing oxygen masks, a standard flight crew procedure for making an emergency descent, and regular training on that procedure. (Plus a bunch of other things I'm not thinking of off the top of my head.)
Assuming ICAO did their due diligence - and I don't have any reason to think they didn't - they would've assessed the probability and severity of all of the ways a consumer power bank might fail. That analysis is the rationale for both the number of power banks allowed on a flight and what you're allowed to do with them. And yes, they will have considered the probability of people not following the rules (which is the reason, btw, that airplane lavatories have enormous "no smoking" signs right above an ash tray).
reply