There are different flavors of stablecoins though. There's the ponzi scheme flavor that is propped up based on hand waving alchemy, and there's the boring (and now regulated) flavor that's actually backed by real money.
There are a lot of people mentioning crypto as a possible solution to this, and a lot of people responding that crypto is a ponzi scheme, and they're not interested. But congress recently passed stablecoin legislation that could possibly fix this problem. Recipients would have a straightforward way of receiving money, and they wouldn't need to gamble on the price of bitcoin. Most people would probably still use a third part payment processor to handle the rough edges of managing money on the blockchain. But if any of them try to pull something like this it would be incredibly easy spin up a new processor and migrate accounts.
All stablecoins (at least popular ones) has the same underlying problem -- it's regulated and controlling entity can freeze any funds because it wants so
Yeah, but so can PayPal and Visa and Mastercard. The issue here is that payments is essentially a duopoly. Itch doesn't have any alternatives because they're locked into traditional payment rails. Stablecoins at least let someone else decide "Hey, you know what, I'm going to create a coin that can be used as payment for porn games." And executing on that is fairly straightforward.
LVT proponents also typically advocate for pigovian taxes (tax things you want less of to disincentivize it) and taxes on rent-seeking activities. So, offshore drilling would probably be hit with something like a carbon tax (directly or indirectly) and tech companies might get hit with a tax regarding their monopolies or IP. The CPAs and the electricians would get off easy, though.
Let's be real: if this scenario unfolded today, your land would be worth more as housing/infrastructure/commercial/etc. than as farmland, some real estate developer would buy it from you, and you'd make a lot of money without having to do anything. If there was a 75% LVT then you'd just make less money.
The reason I brought up this argument is because this exact scenario is happening all over the UK and Ireland right now. One of the houses my wife and I looked at purchasing was built about 20 minutes outside Belfast on old farmland that was converted into a new housing estate. The farms surrounding this housing estate have been incorporated into a new village.
The first two arguments he makes here miss the point of a LVT entirely
> An LVT discourages searching for new uses of land
> An LVT implicitly taxes improvements to nearby land
If I find oil on my land, or if someone builds a park across the street from me, then I should be taxed more. The land is more valuable to me! At a 100% LVT I essentially break even. Anything less then that, and I still come out on top.
The only valid arguments in here are the last two. If people buy a piece of property with certain assumptions and the government turns around implements a 100% LVT, then I can understand why they would be upset.
So sure, there are some practical considerations to implementing a 100% LVT immediately tomorrow with no exemptions, and it probably wouldn't raise enough revenue to eliminate all other taxes. But the government could still raise a ton of tax revenue with minimal deadweight loss by phasing in a 75% LVT over 30 years with a handful of common sense exemptions.
That's assuming you actually own the mineral rights, which are not necessarily the same as the land ownership itself. These are quite often separated and held by different entities. In practice, the extraction of oil under a parcel of land has almost no relation to what the land is being used for.
The author's assertion was that LVT disincentivizes one from using the land productively, and used oil specifically as an example. This example is basically completely divorced from the realities of oil extraction. Nevermind that nobody is building wells in the middle of cities, where LVT matters.
So, that argument seems to rely on a contrived, unrealistic example. I can't see how LVT disincentivizes productive use of lands.
My biggest criticism of LVT is that the name is confusing :)
The idea is that you're taxing 100% of land rents, not 100% of the total value. So if there's a 5% cap rate on your property, and the land value is $300k, then the annual tax bill would be $15k.
If I'm understanding the paper correctly, they're assuming that defenders are also scanning deployed contracts with the intention of ultimately reporting bug bounties. And they get the $6,000/$60,000 numbers by assuming that the bug bounty in their model is 1/10th of the exploit value.
This kind of misses the point though. In the real world engineers would use AI to audit/test the hell out of their contracts before they're even deployed. They could also probably deploy the contracts to testnet and try to actually exploit them running in the wild.
So, while this is all obviously a danger for existing contracts, it seems like it would still be a powerful tool for testing new contracts.
You don't need ordering guarantees for diffs: apply them out of order and the final result should be the same (that's one of the key properties of CRDTs).
So why do you need timestamps? Or, why do you even need a third party server to run HME to begin with? Why not just encrypt the data and let the client figure it out?
It's also just that cops hate cyclists. I don't really have a single neat explanation why but it's hard to ride a bike in a large american city without it being obvious that they do.
Uneven enforcement (like penalties for powdered cocaine vs crack, dress codes, etc.) always come down to classism, racism, etc. It's obvious the prison industrial complex is at play here, whether the appetite is coming from ICE or domestic prisons.
