And what would giving Dennett's view a fair shake ential? I've read and listened to what Dennett has to say on the matter, and the implication is exactly what the author states. It only seems like we are conscious, but we don't actually experience anything. We're all p-zombies, and Dennett has exactly stated that in at least one of his recent talks.
Dennett also tried to deny that we have dream experiences, calling it coming-to-seem-to-remember upon waking up. I don't know whether he still denies the experience of dreaming, but it would be totally consistent with experience being a cognitive illusion. Taking Dennett seriously entails denying any sort of internal experience, whether it being mental imagery, dreams, inner dialog, feel of pain, etc.)
> I've read and listened to what Dennett has to say on the matter, and the implication is exactly what the author states. It only seems like we are conscious, but we don't actually experience anything.
That is not what Dennett is saying. I have read all of his writings on consciousness, and he is quite clear (and in some places says in so many words) that he is not saying conscious experience does not exist. He is just saying that consciousness, real consciousness, is not like what the "mysterians" think it is like; it doesn't have all of the properties that people like the author of this article claim it has.
> Dennett also tried to deny that we have dream experiences
No, he didn't. He asked the question "are dreams experiences?" (in an article with that exact title that appears in the book Brainstorms, and more recently in other articles), and his conclusion was basically "it depends on what you mean by those words". Which illustrates another common fallacy that Dennett often has to rebut: the belief that saying something in ordinary language is sufficient to pin down a precise concept that can be explored and tested.
> Taking Dennett seriously entails denying any sort of internal experience
It does no such thing. Whatever giving Dennett's views a fair shake entails, you clearly have not met the requirements.
I have found Dennett's opponents to be an unreliable source on what he actually believes, but the question of who holds which beliefs is really beside the point - we are not going to understand consciousness through appeals to authority or other ad hominem arguments.
(Apologies I don't have longer to write up what might be interesting to read of his, will do my best for a few minutes!)
What I find his most interesting core claims are basically: "human and animal brains aren't spookily special in some non-physical way, and there are physical explanations for things we've simply failed to imagine and accept yet".
And answering the "well whatabout [spookily special sounding thing]?" questions that naturally arise after that are the real fun challenge. But doing so is really tough, and often requires multiple long-held assumptions be questioned in succession, which is why so much of his work is on the process of questioning beliefs (and where his "thinking tools", thought experiments etc. really shine).
Re: "Dennett also tried to deny that we have dream experiences, calling it coming-to-seem-to-remember upon waking up", he's said himself[0] that is a myth based on mischaracterization of his work[1]:
> More than a few people apparently suppose that I espouse and defend the bizarre 'cassette theory' of dreaming in 'Are Dreams Experiences? '1 Emmett speaks, for instance, of "Dennett's defense of the cassette theory". Since more than a few suppose this, it must be because of obscurity or misdirection in my paper, for I do not end up espousing the theory, and am quite explicit about it. I concoct the cassette theory as a foil, as an alternative to what I call the received view, precisely in order to raise and investigate the question of what in fact would settle the issue between two such drastic rivals.
From what you wrote there are a couple of characterizations of Dennett's positions that suggest you might still enjoy giving some of his work another go with a generous mindset, e.g.:
> Taking Dennett seriously entails denying any sort of internal experience
I suspect Dennett wouldn't deny people perceive internal experience, heck -- evidence of that has been serialized right in your comment. He accounts for each of the phenomenon you describe (mental imagery, dreams as you mentioned, inner dialogue, pain) in his work, just not ascribing any fundamentally non-physical traits to the special-personal-feeling-ness of them.
[1]: It's not hard to imagine how Dennett's claims could end up so often being mischaracterized (even by academic philosophers) -- the stuff he's claiming is subtle and (by its mind-blowing nature) hard to accept! So if someone hasn't yet grokked it, and they re-tell it how they stored it, the reader is doomed to never take seriously that kooky philosopher's claims.
> I suspect Dennett wouldn't deny people perceive internal experience, heck -- evidence of that has been serialized right in your comment. He accounts for each of the phenomenon you describe (mental imagery, dreams as you mentioned, inner dialogue, pain) in his work, just not ascribing any fundamentally non-physical traits to the special-personal-feeling-ness of them.
Right, but under Dennett's account, it only seems like we have subjective experiences. He compares it to the sun rising and setting. It seems like the sun literally rises and sets, even though we know it's the Earth turning. Similarly, Dennett thinks neuroscience will show that although it seems like we have these subjective experiences, they are really nothing more than brain activity, and as such, can be fully described by third person, objective scientific account. This is contrary to what philosophers like Chalmers and Nagel have argued.
> It's not hard to imagine how Dennett's claims could end up so often being mischaracterized
And the same can be said for any philosopher that attracts a lot of disagreement. There are plenty of Chalmers detractors. Do they understand all the subtlety of his arguments? However, I do think Dennett and Chalmers understand each other well enough.
Dennett also tried to deny that we have dream experiences, calling it coming-to-seem-to-remember upon waking up. I don't know whether he still denies the experience of dreaming, but it would be totally consistent with experience being a cognitive illusion. Taking Dennett seriously entails denying any sort of internal experience, whether it being mental imagery, dreams, inner dialog, feel of pain, etc.)