Exactly the same for me, this is incorrect, though not for the reason you point out. The person at the other side of the teleporter is you. One copy of myself dies whereas another copy of myself lives. Both copies are identical, so both of them are me. So in my opinion this should count as a half death.
Otherwise, if the argument was that the destroyed copy doesn't count because I can "feel no continuity", then any quick and sudden death wouldn't count as a death. That would be absurd. If, on the other hand, you believe the teleporter makes a copy of yourself that isn't you, then you're simply not a genuine psychological reductionist.
In my opinion, it makes sense to avoid a 1/2 death by taking a 1/2 chance of staying 100% alive. If it doesn't bother you to die at the teleporter, then any sudden, quick death shouldn't bother you either, which goes against the explicit instruction to ensure survival. This is also true in general without the instruction. If a perfect copy was made of someone, it would be rational for both copies to desire to survive.
Otherwise, if the argument was that the destroyed copy doesn't count because I can "feel no continuity", then any quick and sudden death wouldn't count as a death. That would be absurd. If, on the other hand, you believe the teleporter makes a copy of yourself that isn't you, then you're simply not a genuine psychological reductionist.
In my opinion, it makes sense to avoid a 1/2 death by taking a 1/2 chance of staying 100% alive. If it doesn't bother you to die at the teleporter, then any sudden, quick death shouldn't bother you either, which goes against the explicit instruction to ensure survival. This is also true in general without the instruction. If a perfect copy was made of someone, it would be rational for both copies to desire to survive.