> We don't perceive subjective qualities, subjective qualities constitute our perceptions, dreams, memories and other conscious mental states
And I say the opposite, that our sensory perceptions, dreams, memories and other mental states drive processes that lead us to conclude that we've perceived subjective qualities in them.
> And there are other options you omitted such as identity theory, strong emergence, property dualism, neutral monism and cognitive closure.
To make a long story short: identity theory, neutral monism and panpsychism are basically the same on the property that everything has subjective qualities in some sense, strong emergence is a speculative concept at best that fundamentally amounts to dualism, dualism can itself be easily dismissed as any dualist theory will have a non-dualist equivalent that posits fewer entities and so dualism will never be preferred, and cognitive closure is not even a candidate as regardless of our ability to know consciousness, it still must logically fall into one of the categories I outlined.
And I say the opposite, that our sensory perceptions, dreams, memories and other mental states drive processes that lead us to conclude that we've perceived subjective qualities in them.
> And there are other options you omitted such as identity theory, strong emergence, property dualism, neutral monism and cognitive closure.
To make a long story short: identity theory, neutral monism and panpsychism are basically the same on the property that everything has subjective qualities in some sense, strong emergence is a speculative concept at best that fundamentally amounts to dualism, dualism can itself be easily dismissed as any dualist theory will have a non-dualist equivalent that posits fewer entities and so dualism will never be preferred, and cognitive closure is not even a candidate as regardless of our ability to know consciousness, it still must logically fall into one of the categories I outlined.