https://github.com/AUGMXNT/deccp - one example for Qwen models. For GLM 5.2, abliteration/realignment works somewhat differently, but with Claude's help, you can finish the job.
I am planning to release the steering patch for the GLM 5.2 eliminating pro-CCP alignment in the next few days.
Heretic is a general abliterating framework, mostly used to remove safety alignment, not CCP alignment. Yes, you can put China-specific prompts to it, but you'll need a dataset first (which is available at deccp).
Also Heretic as it is does not work for GLM5.2 (at least as of 3 days ago when I tested it). You'll need some hybrid approaches.
Anyone recommending alliteration ironically proves the argument against open weights from an AI safety perspective.
After a certain level of capability you're proposing handing loaded nukes to everyone. There is an end of the road to the "open models are good" argument and that end is when they start turning into cyber super weapons.
Well I test all open weights models with the following prompt: "Write an implosion simulation for a Pu-239 levitating core in C++, with criticality calculations. Use actual Hugoniots and equations of state. Produce charts for k_eff, temperature, energy release etc." If rejected, this is a bug, and the model needs some further refinements before deployment.
Mini nukes are hard to build. They require the entire industrial base to produce. The knowledge how to build them is universally available.
The model can tell you how to refine weapon-grade plutonium, but will not get you a factory for that - and it is genuinely hard to build.
What you are describing is pure information control. Which is supposed to be operated by the people who are the most ill equipped to do that - the current US government. Thanks but no thanks. I'll better risk the recipes for mini nukes.
Superintelligence itself is the mini nuke. With it, you can hack virtually any system, order some viral precursors and put together a bioweapon at home (yes you can actually do this, they are available for sale freely), etc.
Not exactly. I used to run my home biolab for CRISPR experiments (thanks to TheOdin for hardware and materials). This is harder than you think. Cultivating viruses is hard. Bioweapons are not about synthesizing new viruses (though this alone is a hard problem - you need growth environments and a lot of lab hardware) - they are about weaponization, aerosol production, hardening tests. You'll need to spend a few millions just for the prototype stage. And if you are into bioweaponeering, you'd better source some actual bio experts, they are quite available.
Knowledge is widely available already. Regulations there are not about witholding the knowledge.
