it stops at sharing.
what he describes works OK on the OS. In fact, mobile OSes start enforcing similar stuff.
RSBAC, SELinux, what not, did this for years. NSA you say? SELinux codebase is ridiculously small. It's the concepts that matter, and you know what? These tools are just patchwork for the current OSes, knowingly so. They're far from the silver bullet.
When you add the web its harder. What if Frank's computer is offline? What if its slow as hell?
=> you get these files from google which you do not known, is an abstract entity, yet you trust.
What if you want to modify the file?
=> Now you own it. Including the potentially bad parts.
Now, there are quite a few attempts at writing secure software with a much more complete concept, much closer to the silver bullet.
There is NO financial interest in it. No financial interest means we'll get there very slowly. Plan9 died. singularity died.
What's left? Living with a larger risk is whats left. That's why risk analysis is used for security (just as its used elsewhere). NIST's framework isnt actually dumb. Sure, dollars should probably go into secure software - but that doesn't mean that today sysadmins will make stuff more secure by "not watching logs or updating to 2014.07 when 2014.06 has a remote exploit".
All that to say the PDF is interesting due to whom has been writing it but it's confused and he hasn't found the direction he's looking for yet.
RSBAC, SELinux, what not, did this for years. NSA you say? SELinux codebase is ridiculously small. It's the concepts that matter, and you know what? These tools are just patchwork for the current OSes, knowingly so. They're far from the silver bullet.
When you add the web its harder. What if Frank's computer is offline? What if its slow as hell?
=> you get these files from google which you do not known, is an abstract entity, yet you trust.
What if you want to modify the file? => Now you own it. Including the potentially bad parts.
Now, there are quite a few attempts at writing secure software with a much more complete concept, much closer to the silver bullet.
There is NO financial interest in it. No financial interest means we'll get there very slowly. Plan9 died. singularity died.
What's left? Living with a larger risk is whats left. That's why risk analysis is used for security (just as its used elsewhere). NIST's framework isnt actually dumb. Sure, dollars should probably go into secure software - but that doesn't mean that today sysadmins will make stuff more secure by "not watching logs or updating to 2014.07 when 2014.06 has a remote exploit".
All that to say the PDF is interesting due to whom has been writing it but it's confused and he hasn't found the direction he's looking for yet.